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MISSION CREEP IN MILITARY LAWYERING 
Elizabeth L. Hillman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When we study military lawyers as legal professionals we may be 
seeing too much of what they used to do—run a specialized criminal justice 
system—and not enough of what they do now: everything required to keep 
war-fighting legal. Prosecuting courts-martial and defending servicememb-
ers accused of crime is a small part of the docket for twenty-first century 
judge advocates.1 They also staff the military commission system—minted 
in 2001 and draining experienced litigators from other missions ever 
since—and provide legal assistance to servicemembers, but even those im-
portant tasks consume only a small fraction of military legal resources.2 
Most of military lawyering involves advising commanders on the legal di-
mensions of operations, sometimes termed ―operational law.‖3 And there is 
far more military lawyering than there used to be. Even in a period of mili-
tary drawdown, the pace of growth in the legalization of military operations 
is likely to sustain an increasing corps of judge advocates.4 
  
   Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks 
to Bob Strassfeld, Jean Marie Lutes, David Kocan, and the other editors of the Case Western 
Reserve University Journal of International Law, and the Frederick Cox International Law 
Center and the Law-Medicine Center for sponsoring the symposium that inspired this article. 
 1 See INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL TO STUDY THE JUDGE ADVOCATE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FINAL REPORT i, 2–3 (2011) [hereinafter REVIEW PANEL 
REPORT]. This report, drafted at the direction of Congress through the 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act, provides an overview of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps’ 
manpower requirements (not the military generally). The report provides useful information 
necessary to fulfill the judge advocates’ legal mission within the Department of the Navy 
while contemplating military-wide support needs. 
 2 See REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at x (pointing out that the Department of the 
Navy is required to provide 30 Navy judge advocates and 13 Marine judge advocates to the 
Office of Military Commissions). 
 3 Id. at 3–4 (estimating that 65 % of the Navy JAG corps practice is dedicated to opera-
tional law). See discussion on operational law infra Part III. 
 4 See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick, Foreword, THE ARMY LAWYER, June 
2010, at 1, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/06-2010.pdf.  ―There is 
no indication that the number of deployed JAs will decrease any time soon. Although the 
U.S. mission in Iraq will expire at the end of 2011, the number of JAs deploying to Afghanis-
tan is increasing.‖  Id. 
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Practicing operational law poses an under-appreciated challenge to 
the professional identity of the growing body of military lawyers. Judge 
advocates are a critical bulwark against the risk of the United States military 
and civilian forces abusing their authority and taking illegitimate actions.5 
Because of the expansive missions of the twenty-first century United States 
armed forces, operational law asks judge advocates to perform a vast range 
of roles that frequently overlap, diverge, and grow.6 Many judge advocates 
during the last decade, by any standard of professional ethics, have acquit-
ted themselves extraordinarily well in spite of (or perhaps because of) the 
challenges of managing ―a dual professional identity as military officers and 
lawyers.‖7 They have rejected calls to torture, stressed the importance of 
maintaining the rule of law in fighting terrorism,8 zealously represented 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay,9 and responsibly navigated tensions between 
military and state rules of ethics.10 Yet their multiplying roles create con-
flicts at least as deep and vexing as the frequently studied issue of judge 
advocates defending detainees before military commissions.11 
  
 5 See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department 
of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 410 (2011) (―But it is the actions of lawyers, particularly 
before and in the absence of trial, that has the most pervasive influence on the development 
of the law. Legislatures and courts intervene interstitially, and on rare occasion quite power-
fully, but their pronouncements would be empty without the countless and largely confiden-
tial acts of counseling by lawyers. This occurs primarily through private lawyers advising 
clients about whether and how to comply with law, but also, and at least as importantly, 
through government lawyers in their decisions about whether and how to enforce the law as 
well as their advice to agencies and the President on the proper boundaries of executive 
branch action.‖). 
 6 REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at v (―Judge advocates are playing an ever in-
creasing role in the complex legal and policy environments that currently confront, and will 
continue to confront, operational commanders.‖). 
 7 David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1999).  
See also infra Part II. 
 8 See, e.g., Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account 
of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (detailing the role of judge 
advocates as compliance officers). 
 9 See, e.g., Matthew Ivey, Challenges Presented to Military Lawyers Representing Detai-
nees in the War on Terrorism, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2010) (assessing the per-
formance of judge advocates representing detainees). 
 10 See, e.g., C. Peter Dungan, Avoiding “Catch-22s”: Approaches to Resolve Conflicts 
Between Military and State Bar Rules of Professional Responsibility, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 31 
(2006) (describing various conflicts between state ethical rules and military rules). 
 11 See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1981, 
1998–2004 (2008) (detailing the conflicts of interest challenges faced by judge advocates 
defending detainees facing military commissions); but see Major General Charles J. Dunlap, 
Jr. & Major Linell A. Letendre, Military Lawyering and Professional Independence in the 
War on Terror: A Response to David Luban, 61 STAN. L. REV. 417 (2008); David J. R. Frakt, 
The Myth of Divided Loyalties, article in this symposium issue (arguing that judge advocates 
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Since the military became a permanent United States institution 
during the Cold War, the American armed forces have remained large and 
military operations common, even in times of relative peace.12 The U.S. 
military does not demobilize and it does far more than fight. It occupies and 
pacifies; guards and builds; researches and studies; analyzes and teaches.13 
Lawyers in uniform support each of these disparate and sometimes conflict-
ing missions.14 Judge advocates run elections and approve bombing targets, 
train soldiers on the rules of engagement and prosecute them for violating 
the laws of war, write contracts for construction projects, secure cour-
trooms, set rules for detention facilities, compensate civilians injured by 
military operations, and perform a thousand other tasks unified only by the 
fact that it is the U.S. military that is undertaking them.15 
The potential impact of mission creep, or the ―gradual, unauthorized 
broadening‖ of an original mission,16 on the American military and its law-
yers should not go unacknowledged. In military lawyering, mission creep is 
embedded in the widely accepted structural shift away from military justice 
into operational law.17 The shift toward operational law began before 2001, 
but it has accelerated substantially during the last decade.18 It has the poten-
tial to undermine the coherent norms that are at the heart of stable profes-
sional identities.  
When we ask our lawyers in uniform to practice not only military 
criminal law, but also every type of law in service of every conceivable 
  
involved in military commissions were not negatively affected by a clash of loyalties to 
country and client). 
 12 See, e.g., ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND 
THE COLD WAR COURT-MARTIAL 8 (2005). 
 13 See generally, DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT (2010) (describ-
ing the varied roles of U.S. military forces against al-Qaeda and its allies). 
 14 Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 27–
39 (2003) (discussing five scenarios in which conflicts of interest may arise). 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING INVITATIONS TO 
ABUSE DISCRETION (2d. ed. 2008), preface. See also infra Part IV. 
 17 See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of 
Military Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 877, 880 (2007); Luban, supra note 11, at 
99. 
 18 FREDERIC L. BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT: ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY 
OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI (2d ed., 2001) (2008) (documenting the institutionali-
zation of operational law in the army’s judge advocate general’s corps). Christopher Behan’s 
review in the Military Law Review noted that Borch’s book was more quickly distributed 
and widely available among judge advocates than the 2002 Manual for Courts-Martial – 
which is the ―bible‖ of military criminal law.  See Christopher W. Behan, 174 MIL. L. REV. 
180, 181 n.10 (2002); see also Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, 
and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939, 1118–119 (1998) (describing the legalization of 
military operations prior to the war on terrorism). 
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military objective, we create an expanding set of duties that sprawl well 
beyond easily definable professional roots. The breadth of current U.S. mili-
tary operations combined with the legalization of virtually every aspect of 
armed conflict has handed military lawyers an ethical challenge of daunting 
proportions. They risk being bound not by the rules that generally govern 
lawyers in their representation of clients but instead by what Norman 
Spaulding might term a ―thick‖ identification with the military itself.19 
When a military lawyer has to do everything that the military needs—at an 
historical moment in which the United States asks the military to do every-
thing—only the individual fortitude of judge advocates may prevent them 
from waging ―lawfare,‖ 20 in which law becomes not a brake on authority or 
respect for process, but instead a means of achieving a military goal. 
II. IMAGE 
Before sketching what military lawyers do and suggesting the ethi-
cal challenges of that canvas, we ought to have some sense of who judge 
advocates are and how they are perceived within the legal profession. The 
public image of military lawyers tends toward the sterling, and not only 
because of the handsome actors of recent and long-running television hits 
starring judge advocates and military criminal investigators.21 Military law-
yers have been celebrated of late in both American popular culture and legal 
scholarship because of their role in upholding humanity in warfare amidst 
the ethical failures of other government attorneys.  
Since 2001, judge advocates have stood up, sometimes to their own 
professional detriment, against legal opinions that threatened to undermine 
  
 19 Spaulding, supra note 14, at 26 (―[T]hick identity may lead to lawlessness, a temptation 
to go beyond the boundaries of lawful conduct in order to advance a client’s interests. Here, a 
lawyer’s affinity with the person or positions of her client may make her willing to do too 
much for the client, more than the role and applicable law permit, more perhaps than her 
client does or should want.‖). 
 20 On ―lawfare,‖ loosely defined as the weaponization of law, or its use as a means of 
waging war, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humani-
tarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Ken-
nedy School, Program on National Security and Human Rights, Workshop Papers, ―Humani-
tarian Challenges in Military Intervention‖ (2001) (offering a definition and popularizing the 
term). This term has generated a robust and ongoing debate; see, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Ro-
bert Chesney, and Benjamin Wittes, LAWFARE (2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/. 
 21 See JAG, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (last visited Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.imdb. 
com/title/tt0112022/ (describing ―JAG‖, which aired for ten seasons from 1995–2005) and 
NCIS: Naval Criminal Investigative Service, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (last visited Apr. 
14, 2011), http://www.cbs.com/primetime/ncis/ (describing ―NCIS‖ as entering its seventh 
season). 
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the rule of law. They rejected the torture of detainees,22 limited the targets 
of bombs,23 and defended those detained in the war against terrorism.24 
They did not concur, and were barely consulted, in the creation of the much-
criticized military commissions at Guantánamo Bay.25 Their demonstrated 
commitment to respecting the constraints imposed by the laws of war serves 
as an historical counterpoint to the heedlessness of lawyers of the executive 
branch under the Bush Administration.26 One of those lawyers, John Yoo, 
co-authored an article with coast guard lawyer Glenn Sulmasy that sug-
gested the restraint counseled by judge advocates undermined essential civ-
il-military relations in the United States.27 
Institutional assessments of the judge advocate generals’ corps sug-
gest that military lawyers were better equipped by training and institutional 
placement to withstand the legal detours taken by lawyers in the political 
branches. Analyses rooted in organizational culture stress the way in which 
military values and the integration of military lawyers into operational units 
(or ―co-mingling of accountability agents and operational employees‖) 
enabled judge advocates to object to orders that they considered unlawful 
and persuade others to comply with their decisions.28 Retired general 
  
 22 See, e.g., Dick Jackson, Interrogation and Treatment of Detainees in the Global War on 
Terror, in MICHAEL W. LEWIS et al., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A 
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 126 (2009). 
 23 See, e.g., Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 365, 371–72, 
377–79 (2003) (contrasting targetings by military commanders that have input from military 
lawyers with targetings by C.I.A. personnel). 
 24 See, e.g., Frakt, supra note 11. 
 25 See, e.g., JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 88–89 (2008); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY 121–22 (2007); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of Two Judges: A Judge Advo-
cate’s Reflections on Judge Gonzales’s Apologia, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 893, 897–899 (2010) 
(detailing how judge advocates were marginalized during the Bush administration). 
 26 See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, Ratcheting Back: International Law as a Constraint on 
Executive Power, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 523, 546 n.79 (2010) (―Military lawyers in particu-
lar pushed back vigorously against Bush Administration efforts to avoid the strictures of the 
Geneva regime.‖); Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
389, 400 (2010); Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference Between the Presi-
dent’s Lawyers and the Military’s, SLATE.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2150 
050/?nav/navoa (arguing that military lawyers conceive of the law in a way more conducive 
to compliance with the laws of war); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Tor-
ture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 462–63 (2005) (pointing out public 
rejection of the torture memo). 
 27 See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A 
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815 (2007); but see 
Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on Terror: A Re-
sponse to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 649–52 
(2009) (critiquing the Bush Administration’s position that ―everything changed‖). 
 28 Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of Inter-
national Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 355, 365; 359–72 (2010) (arguing 
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Charles Dunlap echoes many uniformed lawyers in lauding the importance 
of military training in the success of judge advocates: ―JAGs, like all mili-
tary officers, are trained to think strategically, and thinking strategically is 
essential to successfully waging war within the Constitution.‖29 Others go 
so far as to suggest that military officers, despite being part of a culture that 
mandates obedience and deep respect for hierarchy, are expected to question 
the decisions of others30 and that the decentralized nature of military opera-
tions encourages the occasional departure from precedent, thus avoiding the 
perpetuation of error.31 Overall, the scholarly response to the post 9/11 ac-
tions of judge advocates has portrayed them as agile and principled in 
adapting to a remarkably difficult legal climate.32 
The image of judge advocates did not escape the first decade of the 
United States’ war against terror completely untarnished, however.33 The 
2005 Haditha massacre, in which twenty-four Iraqis were killed by U.S. 
Marines, was marred not only by the extra-legal violence that led to so 
many civilian deaths, but by a cover-up initiated by commanding officers 
and a failure to convict any of the officers involved, including a Marine 
judge advocate, because of unlawful command influence during the after-
math.34 In 2004, the world was shocked by the photographs of sexualized 
  
that judge advocates have largely internalized norms of international law, in part through a 
well-developed organizational culture); Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, Profes-
sional Ethics and Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 125, 149 (2009). 
 29 Dunlap, supra note 25, at 901. 
 30 See, e.g., Thomas W. Taylor, The Fifteenth Hugh J. Clausen Lecture in Leadership: 
Leadership in High Profile Cases, 204 MIL. L. REV. 343, 354 (2010) (―In fact, military law-
yers arguably have a greater obligation than most soldiers and civilians to raise questions 
about authority because of the hierarchical rank structure of a military organization that does 
not always appreciate or encourage questions, the special staff relationship that military 
lawyers have with their commanders, and our responsibility as licensed attorneys to uphold 
the rule of law.‖). 
 31 John C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional Obligations, and Professional 
Responsibilities: Arguments for Government Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 73, *88 (2010). 
 32 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Pers-
pectives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549, 634–635 (2011) (―The 
American experience in Iraq, however, has been a story of constant adaptation in which 
changing perceptions of the strategic environment induced both policy and legal change.‖). 
 33 See Eugene R. Fidell, Transparency, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 471 (2009) (pointing out 
that Philip Alston, U.N. Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Sum-
mary or Arbitrary Executions, called on the United States in 2008 to take action to stop un-
lawful killings).  
 34 See Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command 
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 39–45 (2010) (detailing the crimes and investi-
gations stemming from the Haditha incident); see also Dickinson, supra note 28, at 372. 
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abuse and torture emerging from the U.S military prison at Abu Ghraib.35 
Military lawyers participated in the ensuing investigations and prosecutions 
and were not directly blamed for creating the climate that led to such egre-
gious misconduct, despite the lack of effective oversight that made the de-
tention facility such a free-for-all. In fact, some asserted that had judge ad-
vocates’ advice not been dismissed by the executive branch attorneys, the 
incident could have been avoided altogether.36 Even so, the image of mili-
tary lawyers suffered along with that of all of the U.S. military with the re-
velations of detainee abuse.37 
Image aside, there is also some evidence that the traditional core of 
judge advocates’ work, the U.S. court-martial, is operating less effectively 
than most lawyers have realized. Like Professor Chesney’s article on deten-
tion policy, Major Rosenblatt’s work relies on after-action reports to recon-
struct the legal climate of military operations on the ground.38 Rosenblatt, 
an Army Judge Advocate, concludes that the court-martial system—the 
much-celebrated cornerstone of American military law—is failing to func-
tion effectively in combat operations.39 This empirical evidence suggests 
that a closer look at the assumed success of military legal operations is war-
ranted. 
III. MISSION 
Our JAG Corps mission is a powerful force enabler: we deliver 
professional, candid, independent counsel and full spectrum legal capabili-
ties to command and the warfighter. The Air Force, like other Services, op-
erates in an increasingly legalistic environment, which demands nothing 
less than the very best legal capability it can field. The Air Force JAG 
  
 35 See Mills, supra note 34, at 45–49 (detailing the legal response and accountability after 
the Abu Ghraib scandal); see also Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 
2133–138 (2005). 
 36 See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 25, at 903–904. 
 37 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 27, at 655 (noting the high cost of the Abu Ghraib scandal 
in the war against terrorism). 
 38 Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in Combat 
from 2001 to 2009, 2010-SEP ARMY LAW. 12 (2010). 
 39 Id. at 12–13 (2010) (―By any measure--numbers of cases tried, kinds of cases, reckoning 
for servicemember crime, deterrence of other would-be offenders, contribution to good order 
and discipline, justice, or the provision of a meaningful forum for those accused of crimes to 
assert their innocence or present a defense--it cannot be said that the American court-martial 
system functioned effectively in Afghanistan or Iraq. In an era of legally intensive conflicts, 
this court-martial frailty is consequential and bears directly on the success or failure of our 
national military efforts.‖). 
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Corps supplies that demand with its talented and highly trained group of 
legal professionals.40 
The website of the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps 
trumpets the Corps’ mission statement and motto (―wisdom, valor, jus-
tice‖).41 It also supports links to articles like ―The Brave New World of Cy-
berspace,‖ ―A JAG on Capitol Hill‖ (first-hand narratives of air force judge 
advocates in action), and multi-color advertisements for ―JAG Corps 21‖ 
(air force legal services in the twenty-first century).42 Each branch of the 
service has invested heavily in internet public relations and recruiting; the 
sophistication and glitz of the Air Force law-related pages is hardly an ano-
maly among official military internet sites. The rhetoric of the Air Force 
JAG corps mission statement reflects the rising status of military lawyers 
throughout the armed forces. ―Full spectrum legal capabilities‖ in an ―in-
creasingly legalistic environment‖ may not ring like ―duty, honor, country.‖ 
But, those phrases reveal the centrality of law to contemporary military op-
erations. 
The extent to which law is now embedded in military command de-
cisions is difficult to overstate. The range of judge advocates’ duties reflect 
this reality. For example, the Army’s field manual on legal support empha-
sizes the integration of judge advocates into Army units and describes the 
army lawyer’s responsibilities as practicing both operational law and six 
―core legal disciplines‖: administrative law, civil law, claims, international 
law, legal assistance, and military justice.43 The manual is written with a 
sense of urgency and importance; virtually every paragraph notes growing 
needs, greater numbers, and more complexity—in missions, operations, and 
laws. It warns of the increasing pace of military operations, suggesting that 
judge advocates must rush desperately to catch up. They must become ―in-
creasingly refined as soldiers and lawyers,‖ ―more involved in the military 
decision-making process in critical planning cells,‖ and must expand ―legal 
support to meet the mission demands of a force projection army.‖44 They 
have to figure out how to communicate in a ―fluid and technologically ad-
vanced environment‖ even as they support the families of servicemembers, 
navigate the intricacies of multi-national operations, and ―integrate demo-
cratic values into Army operations.‖45 In short, they must do everything.46 
  
 40 The Judge Advocate General’s Corps United States Air Force, U.S. AIR FORCE (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.afjag.af.mil/. 
 41 U.S. Air Force, VALUES AND VISION 3, http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/ 
AFD-080502-052.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 42 See supra note 40. 
 43 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS [hereinaf-
ter FM]. 
 44 Id. at 1.4.1. 
 45 Id. at 1.4.2. 
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The Navy corps describes its legal practice as encompassing ―mili-
tary justice, international and operational law, admiralty law, environmental 
law, administrative law (which itself includes diverse sub-practice areas 
such as command relationships, legislation, military personnel law, installa-
tion law, FOIA/Privacy Act, and ethics), general litigation, claims, legal 
assistance, information operations, and intelligence law.‖47 Military justice 
is estimated to constitute one-fifth of the practice of naval judge advocates, 
legal assistance fifteen percent, and operational law and command advice (a 
full sixty-five percent of Navy lawyers’ efforts) the rest.48 Legal resources 
in the Department of the Navy are also stretched by the demands of a new 
disability evaluation system for wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers, 
by the scarcity of judge advocates who have tried complex and serious 
courts-martial (because of a decline in the court/-martial rate), and the need 
for judge advocates to staff the Office of Military Commissions.49 The com-
plex lines of authority that intertwine the various service JAG corps with the 
office of general counsel in each respective department (of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force) are too intricate for even the most detailed of organizational 
charts.50 
Other observers’ classifications reveal the capacious, complex du-
ties of military lawyers as well. Michael Newton describes judge advocates 
as taking on different roles as the situation requires, acting as ―trainers, ne-
  
 46 Or, more specifically, see id. at 1.5, Summary (―The judge advocate in the 21st Century 
must adapt the traditional role to a more demanding, complex, fluid, international, and tech-
nological environment. The judge advocate must continue to be a master of all core legal 
disciplines, and must be effective in the roles of judge, advocate, ethical advisor, and counse-
lor. The judge advocate will succeed in the new environment by becoming increasingly 
knowledgeable as soldiers and lawyers, maintaining constant awareness of the operational 
situation and communication with technical supervision and support, and integrating consti-
tutional and international democratic values into military operations.‖). 
 47 REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (citing the U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, SEC’Y OF 
NAVY INSTR. 5430.27C, RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY 
AND THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR SUPERVISION AND PROVISION OF 
CERTAIN LEGAL SERVICES). 
 48 Id. at 3–4. 
 49 Id. at vi, 76–77, 148. 
 50 See generally REVIEW PANEL REPORT (showing that there is no attempt to flowchart or 
graph the relationships of all the navy lawyers, military and civilian, in the Navy and Marine 
Corps, described in these pages). Although the history of the distinctions, and contested lines 
of authority, between the general counsels’ offices and the service JAG’s is beyond the scope 
of this essay, the complexities of these historically contested relationships underlie the basic 
question of how judge advocates’ duties should be defined. See Gregory M. Huckabee, The 
Politicizing of Military Law: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 611, 614–
15 (2010) (analyzing the push and pull between the Department of Defense and Congress on 
military legal authority). 
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gotiators, enforcers and reporters.‖51 The ―rule of law‖ mission of judge 
advocates can, by itself, be an overwhelming task.52 Michael Lewis and his 
five co-authors, in a recent treatise on the law of war (and not the full spec-
trum of military legal operations, but only the subset related to the law of 
war), set out seven categories of law.53 These categories encompass those 
concerning the armed conflict itself, the targeting of persons and property, 
detention, interrogation and treatment of detainees, trial, and punishment for 
battlefield misconduct, command responsibility, and battlefield perspec-
tives.54 
The rise of operational law to the center of military lawyering is ap-
parent in virtually every study or report related to the legal aspects of mili-
tary operations. David Luban suggests two primary reasons for the rising 
prominence of operational law among: the ―growing complexity of the in-
ternational law of war in the last century‖ and the increasing importance of 
avoiding war crimes.55 Despite declining budgets, the size of the military’s 
legal corps will continue to increase in coming years because of the pressing 
need for legal counsel during military operations.56  
IV. CREEP 
Judge advocates do not face this mountain of responsibility without 
guidance, of course. The ethical obligations of military lawyers are at least 
as clearly articulated as those that apply to other government attorneys.57 
  
 51 Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military 
Lawyers, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 877, 880 (2007). 
 52 See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH. & U.S. JOINT FORCES 
COMMAND, RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES i–ii 
(2007) (discussing the importance of Judge Advocates in planning, executing, coordinating 
and evaluating rule of law efforts and the lack of guidance available to Judge Advocates as 
they fulfill this task); see generally UNITED STATES  ARMY & MARINE CORPS., U.S. ARMY & 
MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (2007) (providing a counterinsurgency 
guideline for the Army and Marine Corps.). 
 53 MICHAEL W. LEWIS, THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE xv–xvi (2009). 
 54 Id.  
 55 Luban, supra note 11, 1999. 
 56 REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at v–vi.  See also CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, 
AN ANALYSIS OF NAVY JAG CORPS FUTURE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, PART I: RLSOS AND 
NLSOS 47 (forecasting a growth rate in operational law needs of nearly 6% annually, result-
ing in a doubling of need in 12 years).  See also REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 
(―The Panel recognizes the fiscal pressures on the DoD as a whole and, in particular, the 
requirement for the DON to cut overhead in order to sustain combat power, modernize force 
structure, and reset the Marine Corps.‖). 
 57 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 27, at 662–67 (recounting the ethical rules governing 
government attorneys, including military lawyers). 
File: Hillman 2 Created on: 5/13/2011 11:02:00 AM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:44:00 PM 
2011] MISSION CREEP 575 
 
Judge advocates undergo continuous and sophisticated training and educa-
tion, have access to extensive after-action and continuity reports, and often 
receive attentive mentoring by more experienced military lawyers.58 Yet this 
mission creep still poses threats to their professional identity. 
The term ―mission creep‖ was probably first used to describe mili-
tary operations extending beyond their initial parameters; it appeared in 
criticism of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, U.S. operations in Somalia, 
and virtually every conflict since.59 Its negative connotation is real60 and 
since coming into vogue it has been broadly applied in instances of go-
vernmental over-reaching in realms outside the military.61 Mission creep 
implies illegitimacy, a lack of restraint, and an inevitable, undesirable, cost-
ly outcome—in short, nothing with which the U.S. military lawyer wishes 
to be associated.  
Yet, the concept helps expose a potential risk in handing so many 
critical tasks to the U.S. armed forces, and in relying on judge advocates to 
patrol the legal boundaries of military action in realms as disparate as 
claims and powers of attorney, target identification and rules of engage-
ment, space operations, and information warfare. Mission creep means that 
the JAG corps’ greatest needs are in environmental and international law, 
both of which we think of as fields governed in large part by civil, not mili-
tary, norms. Can we simply ask judge advocates to manage all these duties 
in the same way (but better) than the general counsel’s office of a multi-
national corporation? 
We can. In fact, we have. But because of mission creep, because we 
now ask U.S. forces to undertake all the tasks deemed too challenging for 
any other body, public or private, this means that the ―military perspective‖ 
is the only glue that binds judge advocates of the various services, assigned 
  
 58 See generally, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Bovarnick, Read Any Good (Professional) 
Books Lately?:  A Suggested Professional Reading Program for Judge Advocates, 204 MIL. 
L. REV. 260 (2010) (describing how important reading, across a range of fields, and continu-
ing education is to military professionals). 
 59 See, e.g., EUGENE JARECKI, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: GUIDED MISSILES, MISGUIDED 
MEN, AND A REPUBLIC IN PERIL 5 (2009) (describing ―mission creep‖ as the illegitimate 
expansion of U.S. military power); Mission Creep: U.S. Military Presence Worldwide, 
MOTHER JONES, http://motherjones.com/military-maps (last visited April 14, 2011) (docu-
menting the extent of U.S. military operations around the globe); Michael Mechanic, Ameri-
ca’s Global Military Presence: Mission Creep, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Aug. 31, 2008), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10011. 
 60 But see Adam B. Siegel, Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?, JOINT FORCES 
QUARTERLY 112–15 (Summer 2000), available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1825. 
pdf (attempting to renovate the concept as an inevitable result of humane military opera-
tions). 
 61 See generally, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and 
Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (documenting the expansion of public health 
surveillance and the risks to privacy). 
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to various duties, together. When judge advocates face criticism of their 
professional independence, they often mention, with no small amount of 
pride, their conviction that a commitment to the rule of law is the same as a 
commitment to winning wars, since the United States only wins if the rule 
of law is upheld. 
The lack of non-military legal capacity to enforce compliance with 
the laws of war is especially troubling because history has shown us that 
democratic governments are not less, but in fact more, likely to use exces-
sive force and cause great loss of civilian life if they stand to lose a major 
armed conflict.62 Having military lawyers in control of rule-of-law com-
pliance does not seem a sufficient protection against this catastrophe. In 
addition, the very breadth of judge advocates’ roles makes their identifica-
tion of a client tricky, notwithstanding the services’ efforts to address this 
issue.63 Kathleen Clark has argued that government lawyers must scrutinize 
the structures of authority in which they operate in order to accurately iden-
tify their clients,64 a process that is virtually impossible for a judge advocate 
buried in a series of crisscrossing lines of command and responsible for a 
veritable blizzard of operationally critical decisions regarding personnel, 
discipline, compliance, and so on. There are, after all—and despite the lan-
guage of this essay and most commentary on matters related to the U.S. 
military—no ―military‖ officers. There are army lawyers, air force lawyers, 
navy lawyers, coast guard lawyers—and marines. They function within 
units that are both too specialized—interservice rivalry is a tremendous 
source of waste and inefficiency—and not specialized enough. 
The judge advocate must have the ear of her commanding officer in 
order to be effective, yet we know that legal advice is not always welcome 
by commanders whether in the field or in garrison.65 Most military officers 
recognize their legal obligations as essential to accomplishing their mis-
sions; some are so concerned that they avoid potential legal and political 
embarrassment at virtually any cost, making them effective hostages to the 
  
 62 ALEXANDER B. DOWNES, TARGETING CIVILIANS IN WAR (2008). See also Eugene R. 
Fidell, Military Justice Instruction in Civilian Law Schools, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (2011) 
(detailing the need for military legal education in law schools). 
 63 Hansen, supra note 27. 
 64 Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1056 (2007) (―Given the wide variety of roles that government lawyers play, it is no 
wonder that a universal definition of the government lawyer’s client evades us. The next 
section develops an alternative approach. It identifies the government lawyer’s client by 
examining the specific context in which the government lawyer works, paying particular 
attention to the structure of government authority.‖). 
 65 See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 390–91 (2009) (detailing the resistance of some commanding 
officers to the advice of judge advocates as ―Monday-Morning Quarterbacking‖). 
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advice of their experienced legal staff.66 The relative independence of judge 
advocates can function in very different ways, depending on the context in 
which it is exercised.67 
It may be impossible to rein in mission creep, and it may be that 
judge advocates are in fact best situated, among the various alternatives, to 
play the cards they have been dealt in this high stakes game. Perhaps the 
answer is not a refiguring of institutions of government to balance military 
capacity with civil capacity; perhaps it is simply continuing to adjust and 
educate, to hope and aspire, to make changes at the margins. Congress 
could, for instance, eliminate the exemption for judge advocates from the 
joint service requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act so that military 
lawyers are a little less parochial and service-bound in terms of expe-
rience.68  
A recent, unsigned note in the Harvard Law Review explored the 
legitimacy of the U.S military justice system as it has evolved since World 
War II, pointing out that it ―emerged as a made order with legitimacy as its 
organizing principle,‖ and that its success proved ―the value of consciously 
adhering to a plan of design with a coherent driving principle.‖69 It seems 
that the twenty-first century corps of judge advocates might have lost that 
coherent driving principle, that the need to prove itself legitimate is no 
longer a relevant concern to a body of lawyers with virtually unmatched 
reach and responsibility. 
Professional identity is bound to evolve. It is not only military law-
yers who face the challenge of unclear professional norms during and after 
periods of change in job responsibilities and occupational structures. But the 
pace of change in the U.S. military is bigger, faster, and more consequential 
than in most other areas of practice. We have looked to judge advocates as 
saviors, but perhaps they are canaries in the coalmine of ever-expanding 
military operations and institutions. They have been telling commanders 
how to fight within the constraints of the laws of war, and telling the rest of 
us that war can be legal. But perhaps it cannot.  
  
 66 Id. 
 67 Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney Gener-
al, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1936–37 (2008) (studying the impact of the Civil War on the role 
and identity of federal lawyers and exploring the contradictory meanings of independence for 
lawyers). 
 68 All military officers, except judge advocates, are offered joint training in which they 
have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the practices and personnel of other 
services. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 § 404, 10 
U.S.C. § 619 (1986).  An independent review panel recommended that the U.S. Navy ―de-
velop and fund a requirement for [joint professional military education] for its judge advo-
cates.‖  REVIEW PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at xiv. 
 69 Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 937, 958 (2010). 
